Organizing hospital workers: the New York experience. by Cohen, Alana S
ORGANIZING TIOSPITAL WORKERS:
THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE
by
ALANA SUE COHEN
A.B., CORNELL UNIVERSITY
1968
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
1969
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
At The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June, 1973
Signature of Author
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, May 11,
Certified by
1973
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students
Rotch
(NuG I973)
J1
ABSTRACT
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by
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In 1965, two New York City unions waged a campaign to organize
18,000 city hospital workers. The campaign was crucial for the workers who
desperately needed improved working conditions, for the hospitals which re-
ceived an inadequate budget from the city council, and for the unions who
sought a large block of new members to boost their power in city politics.
Inter-union rivalry in New York was intense. By 1965 two unions
emerged as the leading contenders in the public sector, the Teamsters and
AFSCME. In January 1965, the social welfare workers went on strike and won
significant concessions from the mayor in their strike settlement. The strike
victory convinced the Teamsters and AFSCME to initiate a final, massive drive
to determine once and for all which union would dominate in the city. They
selected the public hospitals as their background.
The campaign challenged the resources of both unions, because hos-
pital workers in New York were among the most difficult employee groups to
organize. The unions mobilized their best personnel, devised elaborate
strategies and began a fierce drive that lasted for eight months. Even when
the election had ended and the workers had chosen a winner, the losing union
launched an appeal and prolonged the final outcome for eight additional months.
The selection of a single union to represent workers made enormous
changes possible. Workers received large salary increases and new career
opportunities; the city raised the hospital budget and purchased new equip-
mant and supplies. But most importantly, the winner of the hospital election
cdnsolidated its power to wrest important benefits for all city workers, and
also to wield direct policy-making control in city affairs for public employees.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Fogelson
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies
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INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 1965 hospital workers throughout New York City cast
ballots in an election to choose the union that would represent them in col-
lective bargaining. The election was the culmination of an intensive, eight
month campaign. When the polls opened at 7 A.M. hundreds of night shift workers
who had just come off duty were already waiting to vote. As day shift workers
finished their morning assignments they too proceeded to the polls. Although
the atmosphere was generally calm occasional fist fights broke out. At 3 P.M.
the evening shift arrived and soon joined the long lines of voters. By 7 P.M.,
when the polls closed, 13,000 workers had voted. While Department of Labor
officials and union representatives counted the ballots everyone anxiously a-
waited the results.
The stakes were enormous for the two competing unions, Local 420,
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCMiZE) , AFL-CIO
and Local 237 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The union that
proved successful would not only become the exclusive representative of 18,000
workers in the Department of Hospitals, but more importantly, by obtaining so
many new members, it would emerge as the largest public employee union in New
York. The election was critical to the hospital workers also. They hoped to
select a union that would secure higher wages, improved working conditions, dig-
nity on-the-job and a better way of life for them.
A thorough examination of the hospital campaign reveals possible for-
mulae for waging a successful organizing drive, suggests alternative roles for
public employee unions, illuminates the intricacies of union rivalry and finally
shows the relationship of union activity and city politics. This thesis tells
the story of that campaign, the origins, parties, conflicts and outcome.
Although some written materials exist, the main source of information for
this study has been the participants themselves. Hence an account of the
hospital worker organizing drive is more than a compilation of facts; it is
a description of intense hatreds, personal aspirations, and human compassion.
CHAPTER I
ORIGINS OF THE HOSPITAL ORGAINZING DRIVE
Public employee unions in New York City first began to organize
hospital workers in the early 1940's. The hospitals were an important source
of members for newly developing unions, since hospital workers comprised one
of the largest employee groups in city government. In fact, most of the major
unions at one time or another had established hospital locals and depended on
these locals to bolster their strength against competitors. Yet by 1965, only
one-half of the unskilled hospital work force in the city's public hospitals
belonged to unions. Moreover, unlike other employee sectors, no single union
spoke for hospital workers.
Why then were so few workers organized if the hospitals played such
an important role in union growth? It certainly was not because the status of
hospital workers was satisfactory. Unskilled workers were among the lowest
paid employees on the city payroll. Most workers earned only $3250-$4330 per
year; workers in the highest paid positions earned $5450-$6890. Few workers had
the opportunity to advance into higher paying or more skilled job slots. The
job structure in the hospital precluded mobility. Although a small number of
workers were able to advance to senior positions, most were forced to retain
their original job classifications. Workers who were dissatisfied left the
hospitals for other city positions or if they were qualified entered the pri-
vate market.
Working conditions in the hospitals were deplorable. Locker rooms
and worker meeting areas were infested with rats and vermin. Hospital author-
ities had instituted few precautions against hazardous conditions. Workers
were directly exposed to x-ray machinery and infectious diseases.
7Nevertheless, the workers might have felt some compensation for their
low wages if they had been treated with dignity and respect on the job. Quite
the opposite was true. The hospitals perpetuated a class system of their own.2
Administrators and physicians were the highest rank. Below them was an intricate
network of supervisory personnel in all areas of hospital management -- nursing,
housekeeping, and dietary services. Even within the lowest work category of
aides, there were distinctions and therefore differential status accorded to
workers in the separate management areas; nurses aides held the highest rank.
Again the system was closed. Only a few workers received advances and these were
based on personal favoritism rather than on individual skills.
The worker was entirely at the mercy of his immediate supervisor who
had received little training in personnel management and who operated without
firm guidelines for handling staff. Although there supposedly was a series of
procedures to follow in reprimanding a worker before he could be dismissed, super-
visors rarely followed them. Few workers knew what criteria had been used in
deciding their cases.3
The Department of Hospitals itself was in a state of perpetual crisis.
Although the costs of medical care were continually rising, the Board of Estimates
repeatedly trimmed down requests submitted by the Department.4 Consequently, the
Department had been losing quality personnel to the private sector for many
years. At the beginning of 1965 there were five thousand vacancies in nursing
personnel alone.5 Because the primary constituents of the Department of Hospitals
were the low-income population that used its services, there was little likelihood
that strong outside forces would exert pressure on the mayor or council to improve
services or worker status.
Although the unions had sufficient issues to propel an organizing drive,
to a great extent they had been unsuccessful because the city hospitals were a
difficult arena to tackle. Employment in the public hospitals seemed demeaning
and undesireable to observers, but hospital workers received many personal re-
wards in caring for patients.6 When union organizers approached workers and
argued that they should fight for higher pay and better working conditions, the
workers ignored them. They resented being told that their own self-interest
came before the needs of sick, poor people.7
The typical New York City Hospital worker came from a low-income,
minority family. His parents were unskilled laborers, perhaps even hospital
employees and he had received little education or training to enable him to rise
above the poverty level. He changed jobs frequently and was often unemployed.
Although poorly paid, the hospital worker valued his hospital job and was un-
willing to jeopardize it. He feared that his supervisor would dismiss him for
joining a union or even for speaking to organizers. Many hospital workers were
women struggling to support their families. They especially refused to parti-
cipate in union activities. 8
Many workers had been oppressed by the city hospital system for so
long that they were suspicious of union organizers. Why was someone suddenly
interested in his problems? No one ever worried about him before. Union organ-
izers quickly discovered that workers did not believe any changes were possible
and that worker apathy was the biggest obstacle to effective organizing.
If a union decided to organize one job classification at a time, it
immediately encountered difficulties. Workers performing similar tasks did
not work in the same location; they were scattered throughout the institution
and therefore were difficult to approach. If the union chose to organize workers
on an across the board basis, they still faced obstacles. Supervisors and pro-
fessional staff in every department kept such close tabs on workers that when-
ever organizers entered a ward to speak with workers they met immediate inter-
9ference. To build a cohesive organization in the city hospitals, the unions
had to apply a concerted effort to overcome both the psychological and physical
isolation of the workers.9
Finally, the unions simply did not have the outside support necessary
to boost their efforts. There was little public outrage against the low standard
of living of the hospital workers or the wretched working conditions in the
hospitals. Moreover, there was no organized lobby for patients. Few New Yorkers
agonized over the low quality of care given to the city's indigent. Even a
strike, which normally aroused great outbursts of public sentiment, would have
gone unnoticed in the public hospitals.
Although the inherent difficulties in organizing workers provide some
explanation of the poor state of hospital organizing in New York, the under-
lying causes can be found in the status of the unions themselves.
By 1950 competition in the hospitals had been considerably curtailed.
Two unions vied for hospital members: Local 237, District Council 16 of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Local 420, District Council 37 of
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (a subsidiary
of the AFL-CIO).
Local 237 leaders had at one time been affiliated with District
Council 37 which included parks, sanitation and hospital locals. To bolster
the unions efforts in capturing the public employee market, national AFSCME
sent a young dynamic organizer, Jerry Wurf, to New York. Before long, however,
Wurf's presence in the union created a permanent rift among union leaders. In
1952, Nathan Feinstein and John DeLury, longtime, well-established District
Council leaders, permanently severed their relationship with AFSCME. They
requested and received a Teamster charter and established Local 237. Of course,
they took most of the sanitation and hospital locals that they had original-ly
organized with them, totaling around fifty per cent of AFSCIE's Membership.1 2
Two interpretations of the split have been proposed.1 3 One suggests
that the older leaders and Wurf clashed in their basic philosophy. Feinstein
believed that good connections with bureaucrats and politicians were necessary
for building a strong, effective union. Wurf, to the contrary, felt that this
approach was inconsistent with good trade unionism; the public employee unions
should demand and utilize collective bargaining just as the private sector
unions had done. The second interpretation, however, states that Wurf was over-
ly aggressive and that this posture sufficiently alienated Feinstein and DeLury
to force their departure. In either case, the former allies immediately became
arch-rivals as both DC37 and Local 237 competed for new employee sectors.
Wurf was expelled from major labor circles, but nevertheless initiated
a full scale organizing campaign. Wurf devised a four point strategy: organ-
ize anyone who will join; create issues to stimulate support; focus on receiving
as much publicity as possible and use professional organizers.14
Wurf first concentrated on organizing the Parks Department. When
this was completed, he set his sights on the Department of Hospitals and its
33,000 employees (both service and clerical workers).15 After neglecting them
for four years, he consolidated all of his remaining hospital locals into
Local 420, and focussed considerable effort on winning new members. By 1957,
420 had grown to 4791 members, an amount that accounted for a great proportion
of AFSCME's total growth in those three years. 16
Meanwhile, Feinstein maintained his connections with major union
and political leaders in forging his campaign to build his new organization.
Since he already possessed a large number of hsopital members, Feinstein con-
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centrated on expanding into other areas and attracting new city departments.
Both unions continued to steal workers back and forth.
In 1958, Mayor Wagner issued Executive Order 49 and changed the
rules of the labor-management and union rivalry games in New York City. Ex-
ecutive Order 49 authorized collective bargaining for city employees. Unions
that could claim 30 per cent of the members in a given employee unit could
request an election. The union that won a majority of the votes in the election
would become the collective bargaining representative for that job title.
Some job titles were occupied by small numbers of workers and could be easily
won. However, because many titles were not restricted to just one department
such as Sanitation or Schools, a union had to win a majority of the workers in
those titles in all the city departments where they were employed. For example,
to represent motor vehicle operators, a union had to win the support of operators
in Parks, Sanitation, Public Works and Hospitals.
In response to Executive Order 49, the unions changed the focus of
their organizing efforts. Whereas previously they had concentrated on increas-
ing their total membership, they now eagerly began to accumulate collective bar-
gaining units. Because it was easier to organize smaller units, the Department
of Hospitals lost its attractiveness for the time being.
Executive Order 49 had further implications for hospital organizing.
Despite the obvious need for drastic change in the hospitals, neither AFSCME
nor the Teamsters had done more than perform routine functions for their hos-
pital members. Both unions were intent on building empires, not curing social
ills. Even if they had chosen the latter course and decided to orient all
their efforts on organizing in the hospitals, little change would have resulted
from their securing collective bargaining rights for hospital job titles.
The unions recognized that collective bargaining as it currently operated would
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not give them the clout necessary to tackle the city hospitals.
Unions which did not win collective bargaining rights for workers
in a given title had to wrest salary increases for their members from the
Salary Appeals Board according to the pay scale governing city employees,
the Career and Salary Plan. The Career and Salary Plan determined job titles
and salary levels for all city employees with the exception of five single
agencies -- The United Federation of Teachers, Local 100 of the Transport
Workers Union, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the Uniformed Fire-
fighters Association and the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association. 1 7 Since
the Plan itself was rarely revised, pay increases could be obtained only by
changing the position on the pay scale for a given job classification, for
example, moving from level 5 with its established pay range to level 6, which
provided a higher salary range. Nor were changes in salary levels granted
liberally. The unions were literally reduced to begging for their members,
writing briefs, presenting oral arguments and mobilizing employee demonstrations.
When the Salary Appeals Board finally granted a request, the rewards were most
often quite small.1 8
Under collective bargaining, negotiations for pay raises still follow-
ed the guidelines of the Career and Salary Plan, but the unions bargained for
all workers in a given title, thus having a much greater impact and dealt with
city labor officials rather than with the tight-fisted Appeals Board. Without
question job titles represented in collective bargaining received larger and
more frequent pay raises.
If covered by collective bargaining, the hospital workers would un-
doubtedly have received higher salaries. However, collective bargaining covered
only salaries and a small number of fringe areas. But salaries comprised only
a fraction of the total problem confronting the worker. The limitations of col-
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lective bargaining were obvious to the unions. To win collective bargaining
certificates for hospital titles a massive organizing drive was necessary.
Considering the inherent obstacles to organizing hospital workers, the unions
were well aware of the difficulties they would have in securing new hospital
members. Neither union was willing to commit the necessary resources to
accomplish this task. Moreover, even if they decided to accept the challenge
and were successful, again they would have little impact in improving the
status of hospital workers. Collective bargaining negotiations would have no
effect on working conditions, career advancement opportunities, worker dignity
or the level of care. What was needed was a change in the groundrules covering
the collective bargaining process.
The situation in the hospitals undoubtedly would have remained un-
altered for some time unless an intervening event or person changed the climate
in which the unions were operating. Few workers would have joined unions and
two competing unions would have continued to represent workers, neither one
taking aggressive action against hospital officials. But fortunately for the
workers a confrontation erupted between the welfare workers' unions and the
city administration. A strike ensued which totally changed the complexion of
labor-management relations in New York and transformed the city hospitals into
a battleground for the primary competitors in the public sector, Local 237,
Teamsters and DC37, AFSCME.
The 1965 social welfare workers strike lasted exactly 28 days. 8000
workers struck to improve their work facilities, to reduce their caseloads and
to win salary increases, after an impasse with city negotiators developed over
these issues.
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Two unions participated in the strike, the Social Service Employees
Union (SSEU) representing welfare investigators and Local 371, AFSCME, consist-
ing primarily of supervisors and clerical workers. Mayor Wagner had refused
to intervene in the negotiations with the unions arguing that only wages and
fringe areas were proper topics at the bargaining table and that these had to
fall within the guidelines of the Career and Salary Plan. His statement was
of course in accord with the provisions of Executive Order 49.
In addition to pressing their specific demands, the welfare workers
were asserting their right to strike to enhance their bargaining position.
The New York State Condon-Wadlin Act prohibited strikes by public employees
and provided stiff penalties against violators of the Act. The welfare workers
challenged the Act's legality charging that it denied them their most effect-
ive bargaining weapon for dealing with city negotiators.19
Two key issues emerged. First, the welfare workers demanded that
Wagner expand the number of topics that could be covered by collective bargain-
ing; second, they insisted that all unsettled questions be referred to an im-
partial mediation board. Wagner at first offered to appoint an advisory arbi-
tration panel, but hedged by saying that the City would not necessarily abide
by all of the panel's rulings.20 When the welfare workers rejected his proposal
and continued their strike, 5000 workers were suspended.
After four weeks of striking, Wagner finally capitulated. He agreed
to submit all matters to advisory arbitration including salaries, which he
had originally insisted must follow Career and Salary Plan guidelines. 2 1 In
addition, the Mayor appointed a panel to investigate existing negotiation
policies and to prepare a report with recommendations which would not be binding.
The City, meanwhile, freed arrested union members and agreed to remain neutral
in the unions' state court appeal challenging the Condon-Wadlin penalties. 2 2
-5
The fact-finding panel appointed by the Mayor was composed of two
representatives from each union, two city representatives and was headed by
Charles Schottland, a dean at Brandeis University. Since the panel was un-
able to reach a reasonable compromise, Schottland issued an independent report.
He recommended that the Mayor establish a union-management board to devise
a method for improving collective bargaining and suggested that the new social
welfare workers' contract incorporate provisions for appointing such a board.
In addition, Schottland prepared a wage and fringe benefit package to serve
as possible guidelines for a strike settlement.23 The unions rejected his
wage proposals and continued to negotiate with the city for several months. In
the meantime, the Mayor appointed the investigatory board recommended by
Schottland, later to be known as the tri-partite panel.
Although the unions and the city did not sign a final contract until
June, the unions felt that they had won their victory when the Mayor agreed
to resume negotiations to end the strike. The strike victory drastically
changed the stakes in union-management relations. From here on, the unions
could submit policy issues as well as wages and fringe benefits for collective
bargaining. Although it would be some time before the city would fully expand
the number of issues that would be covered, the initial breakthrough had been
made. Moreover, Wagner had agreed to discuss wage proposals that veered from
the set formulae of the Career and Salary Plan. The welfare worker unions were
able to devise salary packages that they felt met their members' needs rather
than sticking to the rigid requirements of the Salary Plan. Moreover, they
concluded that the Mayor's concessions would be applicable to other employee
groups as well.
Finally, the unions had challenged the provisions of Condon-Wadlin
and were confident that because the city would not assert its power any further
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against the strikers, the courts would lift the penalties. Consequently, the
unions would be free to choose whatever tactics they deemed necessary to win
future demands.
AFSCME leaders recognized from the beginning that the strike would
have futher implications than winning concessions for their welfare worker
members. They welcomed the opportunity to attack Mayor Wagner, since he had
repeatedly shown favoritism to opposition unions in bargaining sessions.
AFSCME was flexing its muscles to demonstrate the power it could exert in
setting city labor policies. 2 4 The Council enlisted the support of national
leaders in its strike effort. Wurf, who recently had become international
president of AFSCME, appeared in New York at rallies and before the press to
support the strikers. In addition, George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO,
applied pressure on Wagner to settle the strike. 2 5 AFSCME leaders were not
satisfied with only winning concessions for welfare workers. Rather they in-
tended to promote the welfare strike as a test case for union-management rela-
tions in general. Victor Gotbaum, who had become District Council President
after Wurf's successor had proven unacceptable, took every opportunity to
assert that the concessions granted to the welfare workers would be applicable
to all other employee groups.2 6
As a result of the strike settlement, the race for collective bar-
gaining certificates took on a new dimension. Wagner had expanded the issues
covered in bargaining to include over-time payments, vacations, pensions and
other similar employee policies. Most of these were issues that were applicable
on a city-wide basis. The Mayor would not negotiate one pension and vacation
contract for the Parks Department and another for Public Works. These policies
would have to be uniform for all departments. At their present size, the unions
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would have to ban together in negotiating these issues with the Mayor, an
impossible task considering their rivalry. However, if one union could secure
enough collective bargaining certificates to represent a majority of all city
workers, it could bargain for workers in every title, not just those it repre-
sented without cooperating with other unions. 2 7
The hospital sector suddenly took on a new importance. The unions
now wanted to win as large an employee group as possible requiring one organ-
izing effort. The hospital workers were the largest unaffiliated employee
group remaining in the city. Whoever could win the collective bargaining
certificate for the unskilled hospital workers would be the victor in more
than the city hospitals. If Local 237 was successful, not only would it repre-
sent a greater number of city employees, it might also put a stop to the sky-
rocketing growth of DC37 membership and perhaps eventually take the lead itself.
If DC37 won, Local 237 would have to settle for a permanent second place
in the public employee sector.
The unions were also aware that the mayoral campaign would greatly
affect the future of union-city relations. Mayor Wagner had announced that he
wouldnot seek re-election that year. A new mayor would therefore be determin-
ing labor policies. In accordance with Schottland's recommendations Wagner
had appointed a panel to study third party mediation and arbitration procedures
and to design new city policies. The report would probably be released at
the beginning of the following year. Consequently, it was imperative that the
unions firmly establish their relative power position before the new administr-
tion came into office.
In addition to the city-wide power that would result from a victory
in a hospital election, both unions recognized that the revised formulae secured
by the welfare strike would greatly benefit hospital workers. Working conditions,
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fringe benefits and a long list of administrative and supervisory procedures
would become topics at the bargaining table. Since the union that won the
hospital worker collective bargaining certificates would become the largest
union in the city, it would be able to exert pressure on the city to reorder
its priorities and give the Department of Hospitals the support it needed to
upgrade patient care, working conditions and worker status.
When the Teamsters filed for a collective bargaining election in
the hospital division, it was far better organized within the hoopitals to
expand its operation and initiate an effective campaign. AFSCME was caught
off-guard and ill-prepared. The welfare strike had been intensive and had
to a great extent depleted staff energies. AFSCME leaders had foreseen the
necessity of engaging in an intensive orgainzing campaign in the hospitals,
but had intended to take some time to recouperate. In April 1965, while they
were still in the process of negotiating a final settlement with the city
over welfare workers, they had to suddenly shift gears and begin a massive
organizing drive in the hospitals.
The campaign to organize 18,000 unskilled hospital workers was
the largest in the city in either the public or private sector since World
War II.28 It would last for eight months. Although there was very little
public attention while the campaign was in progress, the outcome was to have
a decisive effect on union history in New York City and therefore on the his-
tory of the city itself.
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CHAPTER II
THE CAMPAIGN
By all indications, Local 237 seemed the appropriate union to repre-
sent hospital workers.1 Not only did Local 237 present the image that appealed
to the downtrodden worker -- that of a tough, powerful organization but many
workers felt that membership in a Teamsters union was a sign of prestige. Its
identification as a trucker's union did not bother the worker who was interested
in bread and butter issues; the Teamsters fought for their members and were
successful. 2 Moreover, the Teamsters had been in the hospitals so long that
their presence seemed almost natural. In addition to its national reputation,
workers were conscious of the power their union wielded in local politics.
Local 237 leaders had easy access to city officials and won good contracts for
its members.
Local 237's hospital division was indeed an impressive operation.
Union stewards were well-trained to handle problems that arose in the hospitals
and were intent on building a permanent organization.3 237 provided professional
representation. 4 Stewards and chapter chairmen received extensive training to
handle grievances. Rather than alienating hospital officials, Teamster represen-
tatives built a good working relationship which enabled them to process grievances
efficiently and report to the worker as quickly as possible.5
Local 237 represented both rank and file and supervisory personnel.
Many charges against workers were dropped simply by informally contacting his
supervisor who might himself be a union member or by asking a member to intercede
with a colleague on a worker's behalf. Teamster ties with management and super-
visors benefited the worker who could request special favors from his union leader. 6
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Teamster staff worked diligently to maintain their position in a
given hospital. Since stewards earned extra pay for every member they recruited,
they had to develop a personal reputation as a vocal, aggressive leader to
appeal to unaffiliated workers.7 The Teamster setup in the hospitals resembled
a closed shop. 237 staff approached new workers immediately and gave them
the impression that Local 237 was the only union in the hospitals. 8 Discipline
among members was extremely tight. Workers followed union direction to the
letter and trusted their representatives to speak for them.9
Finally, Local 237 offered its workers many extra benefits. The
union had access to different jobs and could arrange promotions. The worker
received good sick benefits when he was still receiving pay from the city and
when he had exhausted his eligible sick days. The union's loan program was an
even more attractive feature. While the union itself could not legally provide
loans directly to members it could affiliate with a loan company or bank and
facilitate member loans. Although financing charges might be high, few workers
possessed the credit rating necessary to receive a loan through other channels,
and for most, the need was enormous.
Bill Lewis, who had succeeded Feinstein as President of 237, was an
ideal leader for a union that represented hospital workers. In fact he had been
largely responsible for founding the original hospital locals and had fostered
their growth through the years. Lewis was black; 60% of the workers were black
or minority. Lewis had himself begun as a hospital worker and typified how a
black hospital worker could succeed in the world. 1 0 He was their hero and they
gave him their allegiance because they believed that his concern for the plight
of the hospital worker was sincere. 1 1 Workers appreciated Lewis' leadership
23
style. Although he was a tough negotiator at the bargaining table, he did not
take radical positions.1 2 Workers who shied away from militant spokesmen liked
his conservative demeanor.
AFSCME, on the other hand, had been negligent in supporting its hos-
pital local and in no way duplicated the well-greased machine run by the Teamsters.
Wurf had focussed union energy on augmenting the size of the union rather than
developing a sound organization in the hospitals. Local 420 had union offices in
only a few of the city hospitals. Union staff operated more of a fly-by-night
operation, relying on their own informal contacts in the hospitals or on enthu-
siastic members encouraging other workers to join.
Wurf did not want aides and supervisors in the same local and therefore
only workers in the aides categories enrolled. 1 3 Wurf designed his policy to give
unskilled workers a better opportunity to advance within the union structure by
not forcing unskilled workers to compete with more educated members. However,
the rapid turnover in the hospitals among aides made it difficult to maintain a
given membership and to build a viable union organization.
420 hospital staff were not professional organizers and had fewer in-
centives for working diligently.1 In many cases, they were employed as full time
aides and engaged in union business in their spare time. Because they received
minimal amounts of training as stewards, they were less experienced in handling
negotiations with management. 420 representatives did not adhere to formal griev-
ance handling procedures. They were more abrasive in their attacks on management
and less conciliatory.15 420 officials insisted that their workers attend griev-
ance hearings to present their cases and refute management accusations, rather
than handling a dispute strictly as a matter between union and hospital officials
and reporting the results to affected members. Management, of course, favored the
Teamsters' approach and indicated their preferences to workers. By excluding
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supervisors, Local 420 could not offer many special benefits to members such as
transfers and promotions; nor could 420 count on supervisors to encourage unaffil-
iated workers to join their union.
Although AFSCME had been building an effective power base in the city,
its image in the hospitals was tarnished. First, Wurf was an unlikely leader for
hospital workers. He was white, his closest staff was white and he had not taken
any affirmative measures to improve the lot of black workers in the city. 16 Second,
Wurf had acquired a reputation for stepping on people to advance his union's
position. Hospital workers saw AFSCME as a depersonalized operation that did not
have their interest in mind.1 7 Finally, because AFSCME was constantly at odds
with Mayor Wagner, its stance on important issues appeared far more militant than
the Teamsters'.18 AFSCME's unconventional tactics alienated the hospital workers. 9
Despite its weaknesses AFSCME was not entirely inactive in the hospitals.
Just prior to the welfare workers strike, the union had successfully mounted a
campaign before the Salary Appeals Board to obtain salary increases for several
aides categories. By utilizing formal channels available as well as by sponsoring
a series of public demonstrations, AFSCME won increases for clerical, dietary,
housekeeping and institutional aides, cooks, barbers and seamstresses. 20 AFSCME
designed the campaign before the Board as its first step in a full scale drive to
organize clerical workers on a city-wide basis and win a collective bargaining
certificate for that job title. 2 1 The hospital workers in other titles did never-
theless benefit from this effort.
The Teamsters' strategy for managing their hospital drive in 1965 re-
flected their position of strength in the hospitals. Few changes in organization-
al structure were initiated to undertake the campaign. Local 237 leaders deter-
mined that they would win the election if they were able to maintain their current
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membership of 6500 workers and add a few additional supporters. 2 2
The Teamsters ran on a platform of "higher wages" and "worker dignity".
They vowed to eliminate the Career and Salary Plan and obtain the best wage and
fringe package possible. By stressing their record of good labor-management
relations on the mayoral level and hospital level, Local 237 organizers asserted
that their union could be even more effective for its members under expanded
collective bargaining rules than it had been before.
The Teamsters pledged to abolish the second class citizenship of workers.
They emphasized their reputation as a tough union that would not permit management
to downgrade workers and call them by their first names. They knew how to confront
hospital officials and told workers "When we'll speak for you, management will
listen." 2 3 Bill Lewis lent credence to the claims that 237 would fight for worker
dignity. With Lewis as president of the union, hospital officials would never
call workers "nigger" and "boy".
In response to the educational and career training programs advanced
by the opposition, Local 237 admonished its members not to be lured by fancy pro-
grams, but to vote for experienced leadership. Although they added that 237
would also sponsor new programs for members, they insisted that it was far more
important to select a union that could handle negotiations for them than one that
focussed on peripheral problems. 2 4
The Teamsters accelerated their services to secure the allegiance of
present members. They enlarged their loan program, actively solicited worker
grievances and demanded meetings with management. Teamster representatives con-
tinuously approached their members, offered them special favors for their con-
tinuing support and reminded them of their responsibility to stick with the union
in the election. 25
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Lewis concentrated his manpower on the hospitals with the largest
voting blocks, Bellevue and Kings County. He believed that if he could win
solid victories in these hospitals, success was assured. He gave less priority
to the smaller hospitals and provided minimal staff coverage. Hospitals with
large black populations were assumed to be Teamster strongholds. 2 6
Lewis remained primarily on the sidelines during the campaign appear-
ing at large rallies and key meetings with city officials. 2 7 He left the day-
to-day organizational matters to subordinate staff and stayed aloof from the uglier
aspects of inter-union rivalry that were played out within the hospitals.
Although the national Teamsters organization made huge financial con-
tributions to the campaign, local leadership ran the hospital drive without
interference. 2 8 Again, the hospital organizing staff remained relatively intact.
When Lewis needed additional help he called upon staff from other divisions in
Local 237.
237 staff maintained the campaign round-the-clock. An organizer would
hold 6 A.M. meetings to attract the midnight and daytime crews and likewise
schedule a 5 P.M. meeting to catch the evening trick and additional day shift
workers.2 9 Long-time members were enlisted to extol the advantages of the union
to newer members who might be enticed by the opposition.30
Campaign literature was prolific. Teamster leaflets attacked particular
administrators and supervisors;31 other handouts extolled the virtues of Local
237 over District Council 37.32 Although campaign propaganda was important, the
Teamsters recognized that their primary asset was the ability of the individual
organizer to sell himself as the toughest, most clever union representative. 3 3
The Teamster organizing style resembled that of the machine politician.
They intimidated reluctant supporters and roughed-up workers in hospital elevators,
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locker rooms and deserted corridors. 420 organizers were also assaulted.
Bribes flowed freely as Teamster organizers encouraged AFSCIE staff to desert
and paid hospital workers to vote for Local 237 on election day. 3 4 However,
the Teamsters consciously kept the violence to a minimum realizing that such an
escalation of the campaign would irreparably alienate hospital workers. 3 5
Unlike 237, AFSCME seemed to be starting its hospital campaign from
scratch. Wurf's successor who had proven ineffectual, was replaced only several
months before the Teamsters called for a collective bargaining election with
hospitals. Victor Gotbaum, a young dynamic leader was imported from AFSCME in
Chicago and was a novice in New York politics. Recognizing that Local 420 needed
an infusion of new blood, he transferred Lillian Roberts from his former office
in Chicago to manage the hospital campaign.
Roberts had just completed a similar campaign in Chicago hospitals.
Although a Teamster-building construction coalition had defeated her, she
successfully led a workers strike and secured needed pay raises. 3 6 Moreover,
once a nurses aide herself, she was both cognizant of the obstacles inherent in
organizing workers and committed to their betterment.
Roberts undertook a complete assessment of the hospital situation.
She visited all the hospitals and met with existing staff. She also circulated
among workers to determine their needs. Then, Roberts designed a strategy based
upon the information she had elicited. The approach that evolved to a great extent
suited the underdog position of the union in the race. Rather than playing a
defensive role and accounting for past inadequacies, AFSCME chose an offensive
position proposing creative new programs and a drastic overhaul of union-manage-
ment relations. Roberts decided that a three-pronged approach was needed:
solidifying existing 420 membership, converting Teamster members to the AFSCMIE
local and attracting the uncommittedone-third of the worker population.
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While AFSCME agreed that wages and worker dignity were important, it
totally rejected the idea that these were the only factors to consider. AFSCME
advocated an approach that incorporated both the traditional worker benefits
and the broader social needs of the hospital employee. The union proposed,
1) to create educational programs to give workers real options for upgrading them-
selves in their career; 2) to fill the vacuum that existed in the job structure
of the hospitals by demanding more intermediate supervisory jobs; and 3) to build
worker self-respect by giving them an important role in union affairs. With
training, promotions and prestige, the hospital workers would receive higher
wages and be treated with the dignity that befit their important role in the
functioning of the hospital and delivery of care.
Gotbaum and Roberts insisted that workers aim for the ideal in both
their home lives and work lives and not settle for a little bit more than they
already had.3 7 Roberts and her hospital staff attacked the idea that workers do
not think for themselves and only want good times. They intended to challenge
the hospital worker to use his brain to help himself by going back to school.
Local 420 staff saw their biggest challenge as changing the poor self-image of
the worker that had been perpetuated by the hospital administration and also
the unions. They struggled to get an individual worker just to think about issues
other than wages and fringe benefits and to talk to their friends and relatives
about a career ladder. Once a worker asked questions about 420 programs they
felt they had won a member. 3 8
To achieve her goals in the election, Lillian Roberts had to first,
counteract AFSCME's image as a white man's union, second, equip her staff to
handle the upcoming battle and third, demonstrate that Local 420 was not a do-
nothing union with no muscle, that it would take the initiative to fight hospital
and city officials.
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Roberts could not hope to build the reputation that Lewis had
gained among blacks in so short a period of time, but she did become a heroine
in her own right. Ebony Magazine had written an article in 1964 describing
Lillian Roberts' involvement with the Chicago hospital workers. 420 organ-
izers talked about her past experiences and distributed reprints of this
article among the workers. 3 9 But she did not intend solely to live on her
past merits. Unlike Lewis, Roberts immersed herself in the middle of the
campaign. She visited each hospital frequently and went out on the wards to
organize, rather than leaving this task to her staff. She also appeared at
union meetings to answer worker questions.
Roberts undertook a series of promotional activities to change the
union's image. With other union leaders, she participated in national, black
protest movements. Union papers and leaflets showed Lil Roberts joining the
Poor People's Campaign in the summer of 1965.40 In addition, she recruited
Jim Farmer, then Director of CORE and an ex-AFSCME organizer, to attend a hos-
pital worker rally. Commenting on Farmer's visit, the Public Employee Press
(official paper of DC37) remarked "... when Mr. Farmer passes a hospital today,
he still wants to stop and handle a grievance." 4 1 The paper then added that
Mr. Farmer's work with CORE in fighting the battles of Negro Americans has shown
that militancy pays off. 4 2 AFSCME was thus able to capitalize on Farmer's pres-
tige as a black leader and lend respectability to a more radical approach to
tackling problems among its very conservative worker constituency.
Roberts similarly had to secure the allegiance of her staff members
by convincing them of her skills as an organizer and her commitment to the cause of
the hospital worker. Her visits to the wards served to demonstrate her concern
for the workers as well as to indicate her willingness to share the dirty work
with her staff. The staff accordingly saw themselves as equal partners in the
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same endeavor. 4 3 Moreover, Roberts used these occasions to train her staff in
effective organizing techniques and to give them assurance that their mission was
not insurmountable.
Roberts was uncomfortable with national AFSCME staff and refused
their direct intervention; like Local 237, AFSCME received substantial financial
support from national headquarters. Wurf also lent support at rallies and strategy
sessions whenever requested. Roberts selected staff who were enthusiastic and
who were willing to work under pressure.4 4 Hospital workers were chosen to organ-
ize other hospital workers, because they knew their respective institutions and
could communicate effectively with fellow employees. Unlike 237, 420 distributed
its staff evenly throughout all of the city hospitals. Roberts felt that she had
to go after workers who were not in Teamster strongholds as well as fight 237 on
their own turf. Employees in the smaller hospitals could produce enough votes to
give -her a victory.
Since many new staff were added, it was imperative that they receive
training to carry out their responsibilities. Roberts role in this area was even
more crucial. Special steward's classes were instituted during the campaign. The
courses acquainted the stewards with hospital grievance procedures, collective
bargaining machinery, worker services and benefits and the role of different union
staff in assisting members. The classes also reviewed 420 proposals for promotion
and advancement in the hospitals.45 Descriptions of the steward training program
appeared in campaign handouts as an example of how Local 420 was attempting to
improve its services to members.
Roberts did, however, encounter difficulties in managing her staff.
Early in the campaign, two chapter chairmen joined the Teamsters while still claim-
ing to represent 420. Rather than creating a scandal and completely upsetting her
organization, Roberts gradually reduced their responsibilities, informed other
staff in those institution what she suspected to end their confusion and eventually
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forced the traitors out of office when she had found replacements. With this
approach, she gained the respect of staff and workers for her skillful and dig-
nified handling of a crisis situation.
Again it was important for DC37 to demonstrate its toughness on be-
half of hospital workers. Like the Teamsters, Local 420 expanded its grievance
handling role. However, 420 added a special feature. At organizing meetings,
420 staff would publicize the successful results of grievance hearings with man-
agement and encourage members to publicly describe additional problems they wanted
the union to tackle. To attract new members and to show their commitment to hos-
pital workers in general, 420 agreed to represent non-members as well and accepted
challenges from non-members, even Teamsters, to represent them. 4
7
AFSCME confronted city administrators also. At every possible
opportunity, DC37 sought small gains for workers in individual hospitals and on
a city-wide basis. Laundry workers secured a four grade level raise and $480
differential for handling contagious materials; at Morrisania Hospital, following
a strike, part-time employees received preference for full-time openings over new
employees; ambulance attendants received first priority in taking promotional
exams to fill Motor Vehicle Operator vacancies.
At the Commissioners level, DC37 attacked the problems of affiliation
and worker training. A number of city hospitals were affiliated with private
hospitals. While city administrators were supposedly in charge, for the most part,
the directors of.the private affiliate obtained control. City employees suffered
as a result. Two disciplinary procedures were in operation at the same time, the
city's and the administrator's. The private administrator bypassed city employees
in favor of private employees for promotions or for vacancies. In many cases
civil service protections were denied city hospital workers. Gotbaum tackled
this problem himself. After a series of meetings over a period of several months,
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the Commissioner of Hospitals agreed to remedy the inequities and enforce his
ruling among private hospital administrators. 4 8
Finally, DC37 presented a series of demands to the city to provide
training assistance for hospital workers to prepare them for promotional oppor-
tunities and new careers. In addition, union officials bargained with the U.S.
Department of Labor to receive grants from the Manpower Training and Development
Program.
The career ladder and training proposal was both the main feature of
420's program package and Lillian Roberts' pet project. Roberts believed that
her program would eliminate the dead-end character of the majority of the jobs
occupied by non-professional workers and resolve the acute personnel shortage
of the Department of Hospitals.
Nurses aides, dietary aides, housekeeping aides and institutional aides
usually kept the same jobs as long as they continued to be employed in the hos-
pitals. Workers were entitled to merit salary level increases and occasionally
received promotions to lower-level supervisory positions. A limited number of
employees did receive training for job advancement, but were usually selected on
the basis of personal favoritism rather than on merit. 5 0 A few nurses aides might
enroll in courses to become licensed practical nurses; dietary aides might receive
training to prepare them as cooks. There were no intermediary jobs such as senior
dietary aide or senior housekeeping aide. Moreover, when an aide did receive
training from supervisors to equip him to perform a more technical task, he did
not receive credit by changing his job title or through an increase in pay.
This was especially true for nurses aides who substituted for technicians and
specialists in the operating room and x-ray laboratories.
Roberts proposed a career ladder that '.ould give workers new skills
and guarantee them job slots in the city hospitals. The program itself was rela-
tively simple. All qualified nurses aides would receive training to qualify as
33
licensed practical nurses; later on they might receive further training and
eventually become registered nurses. Intermediate steps might include train-
ing as aides or technicians in oxygen therapy, x-ray treatment, ambulanc& ser-
vice, operating room care and obstetrics-gynecological services. However, workers
would not just receive training, they would be encouraged to take licensing exams
and receive bona fide promotions.
Her program for other aide categories was not specific, but Roberts
intended to develop the career plan in these areas as well. Educational oppor-
tunities for dietary aides might lead to promotions as cooks, senior cooks, and
possibly dieticians. In the institutional and housekeeping departments, the union
would create senior aide positions and train workers to fill them. Moreover,
workers in these jobs could transfer to other divisions and become nursing or
dietary staff.
Training could be provided in the hospitals or in special classes
arranged especially for workers in other locations. If in the hospital, workers
would of course receive full pay; if outside and if a training program involved
an extensive time commitment, workers would work part-time and still retain their
jobs and promotional rights. The union hoped to supplement the salaries of wor-
kers who could not live on part-time wages through special funds from federal
government sources.
In 1965, the career ladder was a startling and controversial project.
The union had to convince workers that they were capable of learning new skills
and that their whole orientation to work could be changed with the creation of
incentives for improving oneself on the job. Hospital officials regarded workers
as unteachable, but more importantly, refused to accept the financial burden of
paying workers while they were spending part of their work time receiving advanced
34
training. While 420 organizers. attempted to sell the program to workers, AFSCME
leaders negotiated with the Department of Hospitals.
Contrary to the Teamster approach, AFSCME did not present the collec-
tive bargaining process as one that was entirely the domain of union leaders.
420 staff took great pains at union meetings to explain collective bargaining pro-
cedures to workers. Union staff also solicited worker suggestions for what they
wanted included in the bargaining package.5 1 The union would not bargain for
them; it instead planned to bargain with them and to follow worker direction. 5 2
By promoting worker involvement in designing programs and demands AFSCME hope to
build worker self-respect.
AFSCME also stressed the importance of winning more collective bar-
gaining certificates to secure a majority of city employees. Union organizers
promoted DC37 as the best union to represent all city workers. Campaign leaflets
quoted Gotbaum as saying, "When we win, we'll be able to give benefits thousands
of others have won to hospital workers. DC37 holds far more collective bargaining
certificates than all other organizations combined." 5 3 AFSCME hoped to impress
workers by its efforts to build a large and powerful union. 5 4
Although AFSCME kept its campaign as positive and forward looking as
possible, it certainly did not ignore its Teamster opponents. Local 420 pre-
sented their brand of representation as superior to Local 237's. AFSCME attacked
the Teamsters on several counts in an attempt to keep them in a defensive posture.
They levied their main criticism against the inclusion of supervisors in the same
union with non-professional workers. In response to Teamster claims that workers
benefited from the liaison, AFSCME argued that a union could not adequately repre-
sent a worker in a grievance against another union member. There undoubtedly were
too many deals 'taking place. The fact that Teamster representatives never took
a worker in with them at a grievance hearing but met privately with management
and then came out to announce the verdict was proof of collusion. AFSCME organ-
izers told workers that the Teamsters did not allow a worker to confront his
accuser and defend himself, because they could not doublecross him when he was
present.55 Local 420 also vowed to end the Teamster monopoly on worker promotions
and re-institute competition on a merit basis.
Local 420 attacked the Teamsters' record in the hospitals. They
asked workers, "... if the Teamsters were really concerned with hospital workers,
why didn't they get collective bargaining rights long before now." 5 6 Indeed
the Teamsters had secured enough membership cards to call for an election before
1965; AFSCME attempted to place much of the blame for both unions' negligence on
the Teamsters.
Finally, AFSCME attacked the Teamsters for substituting brawn for
programs. Teamster muscle was equated with intimidating workers; AFSCME muscle
meant confronting the big bosses. 420 staff continually asked workers, ... if
the Teamsters threaten you now when they're not in power, what will happen to you
if they win the election and you have no one else to turn to?" 5 7 Occasionally,
420 asked questions about the ability of a truck drivers' union to serve the in-
terests of hospital workers, but they chose this tactic to infuriate the Tea-sters
and put them on the defensive rather than to win workers, who were not particularly
swayed by this argument.5 8
420 organizers concentrated their efforts on extensive leafletting,
frequent organizing meetings and informal contacts on the wards. Leaflets were
a significant vehicle of communication in the campaign, since they responded to
new developments more quickly than was possible by individual worker contacts and
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reached a larger audience. New leaflets appeared each week, and organizers
deposited them at entrances, in lockerrooms and in the employee lunchrooms.
The career ladder was the primary topic of 420 campaign literature. Slogans
included:
Attention all cooks and senior cooks:
Vote for 420
for
* higher salaries
* on the job training
* to get dietician out of the kitchen
* more promotional opportunities
* city paid education classes (during the working day)
Join with your fellow cooks to get this program5 9
Messengers: are you satisfied with the pay that you're
getting? Happy with your working condition:
Want to make things better? You can and you
will when you vote for Local 420 on December 3.
Aides:
420 offers you
* better wages for a better way of life for you and
your family
* better working conditions to give you dignity and
pride in your work
* training programs
* promotions
* decent treatment from supervisors and fair grievance
hearings6 0
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Press and television coverage of the- campaign was limited; 420 sponsored radio
programs featuring talks by Victor Gotbaum and Lil Roberts.61
420 meetings were like revivals. Union staff encouraged workers to
vent their frustrations in an effort to demonstrate union empathy for worker
problems. 6 2 The union announced resolutions of worker grievances and explained
programs and new accomplishments with city officials.. The meetings provided a
good medium for organizing by taking the worker away from the tensions in his job
and giving him an opportunity to focus on his own problems. 6 3
Despite the frenzy of the campaign, 420 staff exhibited extreme patience
in organizing workers, describing career ladders and training programs and answer-
ing all other worker questions. They pursued a gentlemanly, diplomatic approach
to highlight the Teamsters' bullying. 6 4 Again, 420 contacted all workers, even the
oldtimers who had worked in the hospitals for forty years and whom the Teamsters
had dubbed hopeless. 6 5
In almost all respects, AFSCME's style was in sharp contrast to the
Teamsters'. New techniques and new ideas proliferated. The zeal of a new gener-
ation of organizers differed greatly from the cynicism of the seasoned campaigner.
While the battle raged in the hospital corridors, the procedural
details of the election were hammered out on yet another level of confrontation.
The leaders of Local 237 and DC37 met throughout the campaign to establish collec-
tive bargaining units and set rules for the day of the election.
AFSCME wanted the hospital workers to vote as separate units based
upon individual job titles. The Teamsters opposed this division into distinct
classificationspreferring that the workers, with the exception of the clerical
workers, vote as an entity.66 The Department of Labor sponsored a series of hear-
ings to determine if the units proposed by DC37 were appropriate for collective
bargaining. 6 7
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The unit breakdown was crucial to Roberts' program of offering special
training and promotional opportunities to each job title. The Teamsters preferred
to lump the worker units together, since they felt they would have an advantage
in securing the largest number of total votes. To argue her case, Roberts requested
that the Department of Hospitals produce records in evidence at the hearings that
described the job responsibilities of each aide group. The records would not only
serve to bolster DC37's claims at the election hearings, they would also serve as
a basis for the union's bargaining program if it won the collective bargaining
certificates. 6 8 When the hospital refused to supply the records (they were backed
by the Teamstersin their refusal), DC37 took the issue to court. The New York
Supreme Court ruled in AFSCME's favor.6 9
AFSCME capitalized on this victory in press releases to hospital wor-
kers. Newspaper accounts of the court decision concluded:
"... the victory struck a blow at the agreement between the
Teamsters and the Administration to put all aides into one
unit under one title.. The records released by the hospitals
prove.. that nurses aides actually perform the work of nurses
and dietary, housekeeping and institutional aides are doing
highly skilled work... We can now build a solid case to de-
mand more money at the bargaining table. 70
The final agreement reached between DC37 and Local 237 was a compro-
mise. The following election units were established: 7 1
1) nurses aides, dietary aides, housekeeping aides and institu-
tional aides
2) clerical workers
3) cooks and senior cooks
4) messengers
The Teamsters failed to insure that all job titles would vote as one. For the
purposes of the election, however, all aides were grouped into a single election
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unit and count6d as such. But for bargaining purposes, each aide title could
be considered individually with separate requests and demands for each. Of
course, certain demands would apply to the whole collective bargaining unit as
well.
Both sides created delays in setting the final election date. The
Department of Labor handled all the technical objections. It almost seemed that
neither side wanted the election to take place. 7 2 Lewis at first tolerated the
delays because he was so far ahead and did not see Lillian Roberts as a threat. 7 3
As the months passed, both unions were hesitant since they did not know how many
green cards (member sign-up cards) they actually possessed. 7 4
The election was finally set for December 3. The City Department of
Labor would conduct the election, set up the polling places, oversee the voting
process and tabulate the results of the secret ballot with union delegates looking
on. Eighteen polling places were to be established; some would be placed directly
inside hospitals, others in nearby buildings. Two Labor Department representatives
and two representatives from each of the contending unions would be permitted to
man the voting sites.
The confrontation between Teamster and AFSCME leaders at the election
hearings was mild compared to the conflict that erupted in the corridors of the
city's public hospitals. The organizing campaign transformed the hospitals into
a state of frenzy and disruption that lasted for the entire eight months of the
campaign. Interaction occurred on several levels: between union staff and hospital
officials, between opposition union groups and finally, between union organizers
and hospital workers. Although the constraints and pressures differed in each
case, all the parties involved in the campaign experienced the intensity of feel-
ings and commitment of energy that propelled the organizing .drive. Descriptions
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of the election campaign from the perspectives.of the three effected groups,
administrators, union staff and workers, are provided below.
The administrators of the individual hospitals, who were already
burdened by the problems inherent in operating under a stringent budget, discover-
ed that the campaign made their jobs even more unmanageable. They were advised
by Hospital Department officials to facilitate communications with union staff; 7 4a
but as a result, they become totally preoccupied with labor-management disputes.7 5
The administrators contended with almost twenty-five times more
grievances during the campaign than had been true previously.7 6 The increase was
due in part to the accelerated activity of union staff in uncovering worker prob-
lems, but in many instances, administrators were handling grievances they had
already resolved. A worker who was dissatisfied with a decision made in the morn-
ing would appeal to the other union or else be approached by the other union to
bring his case once again before a hospital official. The official could not
refuse to hear the second union's appeal, because of the constraints of the cam-
paign.77
Once the unions learned that the Department of Hospitals had ordered
hospital directors to ease administrative pressures on the unions, they took ad-
vantage of the situation. The unions would request management to assemble key
supervisors and assistants to discuss urgent problems, but instead turned the meet-
ings into grip sessions. Union staff would criticize a supervisor and when he
responded, union staff would try to make him look foolish. Workers were often present
at the meetings and whereas the union's image was bolstered, management represen-
tatives were humiliated.7 8 The hospital director was under attack from his staff
for permitting the meetings and lambasted by the unions if he refused.
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Although hospital st-aff were suppo.sed to remain neutral, it was a
difficult principle to enforce. Rules were established guiding union activities
in various work areas. If one union managed to sneak onto a ward unnoticed and
the other was caught and removed by a hospital official, the union accused the
administration of prejudice. An individual supervisor who might favor one union
over another or belong to one of the unions (i.e. Teamsters who continued to
represent supervisors) would fail to report or even encourage a transgression of
the rules.79 There was little a hospital administrator could do to prevent his
staff from threatening to fire workers who did not join a particular union.
He rarely received specific reports and if he did, it was his supervisor's word
against a worker's. Not all administrators were helpless victims. Several chose
sides, while maintaining as neutral a front as possible. It was quite easy for
a hospital official to create obstacles for union staff by enforcing restrictions
more extensively, refusing to approve the distribution of campaign leaflets and
of course by ruling against a given union in grievance proceedings.
The hospital administrators were irritated by the prolonged campaign.
Their professional staff was upset, workers were disrupted and they themselves
were sidetracted from crucial administrative responsibilities. The election would
restore peace and order to the hospitals with possible gains, if a single, strong
union could force the city to change its hospital policies.80
Union interaction during the campaign was vicious, although the number
of actual violent incidents was minimal compared to previous inter-union squabbles
and considering the high stakes of this election. Scare tactics were prevalent,
minor bruises always expected. Pride and personal investment in the campaign made
feelings of hatred against opposition staff even more intense. Both sides know
that a victory was essential and acted accordingly.
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Entranceways and the cafeterias were prime confrontation areas.
Whichever union could station its organizers first at these key spots with
leaflets, controlled worker opinion for the day; nor were these locations ever
conceded graciously. Because organizing meetings were so crucial for selling
a union's position, it was important for union staff to dissuade workers from
attending an opponent's meeting or to disrupt the proceedings. The Teamsters
were infamous for the latter tactic. On one occasion, a 420 organizer found
himself conducting a meeting without any staff support while ten Teamster ruf-
fians stood outside the door harassing workers. He went to the doorway, encour-
aged individual workers not to be dissuaded and then carried through the meeting
despite continued interference by the Teamsters. 8 1 Not all organizers who were
threatened came away uninjured. At one point, even Lillian Roberts was drawn into
the action defending Gotbaum against a Teamster woman organizer who assaulted him
and then was about to be rescued by male supporters. Roberts intervened and a
fist fight between the two women ensued. Lil Roberts was victorious. 8 2 One
night meeting, however, culminated in a stabbing of a 420 organizer. The organizer
was leading interested workers into a 420 meeting when he was attacked and knifed
by Teamster supporters. 8 3 Although the injury wasn't serious, both sides imme-
diately intensified their activities and instituted greater precautions for their
staff. Even then, the same organizer was attacked several weeks later.
The spying network of the two unions was intricate. Each side kept
a running count of how many workers were approached and how many had signed the
<pposition's green cards. The system was imperfect, since a single worker could
easily switch his affiliation three or four times during a single day. Neverthe-
less, the competition between the two organizing teams persisted, each one hoping
to make the final conversion. The real prize was always a turncoat organizer.
Both unions succeeded in enticing opposition staff to join their side, who in
turn quite often brought worker supporters with them.
The workers, who were at first astounded by the attention given
them by their union leaders, soon became as exhausted as the organizers them-
selves and certainly were more confused.8 3 The Teamsters threatened then phy-
sically if they didn't join 237 and 420 organizers badgered them for not stand-
ing up for their rights and selecting the union that would best provide for their
future career. Worker became pitted against worker as allegiance to a particular
union developed. Supervisors intervened and likewise threatened to fire workers
who did not vote a particular way. Bribes of various sorts from both sides were
extremely common. By the end of the campaign, no one was speaking to any one else.
Workers would dodge down a corridor or out an entrance to avoid being approached
by an organizer.8 4
The workers had a difficult choice before them. The Teamsters were
already firmly established in the hospitals, were experienced in dealing with
management and presented the tough, fighting image that the worker envied and
appreciated. Local 420's record was poor, but their proposals were appealing and
they seemed committed to the worker's problems. Was 420 correct in saying that the
Teamsters had been lax in representing workers? How could one be sure that once
in power, 420 would not behave in the same manner? These and other questions remained
as election day approached.
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CHAPTER III
THE ELECTION AND THE RETURNS
December 3 was a cold, rainy day. Union organizers from both sides
knew they would have to double their efforts to encourage workers to vote. Even
without the rain the organizers' job would be difficult. The polls were open from
7 A.M. to 7 P.M. to enable workers on all three shifts to cast their ballots.
Workers who were going off duty, tired from their night's work, had to be cajoled
into delaying their trips home. Union staff would be spending a large portion of
their day transporting workers who were off duty to the polls. Finally, they had
to contend with the day workers. With the poor weather, many would not want to
stand outside in lines waiting to vote or would use their one hour time-off to
relax, rather than to participate in the election. Furthermore, since some of the
polling sites were a short distance away from the hospitals, some workers simply
might not go out of their way. Union organizers knew that they would have wasted
all their preparatory efforts if the hospital workers, for whatever reasons, de-
cided to bypass the polls.
Both sides made elaborate preparatiorsto get out the vote. Busses
and cars picked up voters at their homesor at central locations; union staff per-
sonally escorted workers who were on duty. Several workers commented that they
feared retaliation by Teamster organizers if they voted for Local 420. 420 staff
reminded these workers that the balloting was secret, that the Teamsters would
lave no way of distinguishing them from other voters and urged them to accept what-
ever bribes the Teamsters offered. Then they could vote for Local 420 when they
entered the polls. Those workers who still felt intimidated were promised pro-
tection.
Within the polling areas, the two unions continued to battle one
another. Union pollwatchers continually challenged the eligibility lists even
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though the Department of Labor had prepared them from Department of Hospital
records. One union would accept a potential voter and the opposition pollwatcher
would insist that he was an outsider and ask Labor officials to disqualify him.
When irregularities occurred, union representatives protested at once. Consequent-
ly, long delays resulted, frustrating the pollwatchers but also the workers who
were waiting outside to vote. 2
While the ballots were being counted, tempers flared even more readily.
Union representatives challenged some ballots and attempted to hide or destroy
others. On Welfare Island, Teamster reinforcements brought guns to force out
Local 420 pollwatchers. By the time the police arrived to check complaints, the
Teamsters had removed the guns. Although the immediate threat had ended, the rest
of the counting was traumatic for Local 420 members. Even after the tally was
completed, the Teamsters did not end their harassment; 420 staff returned to find
their car sabotaged. Fearing for their lives, they forced an unwilling taxicab
driver to take them off the island.3
When all the votes were counted and the results announced, Local 420
had won the election. The final results were as follows:4
For the Aides Title (Nurses' Aide, Housekeeping Aides, Dietary
Aides, Institutional Aides)
Approximate number of Eligible Voters 17,266
Number of votes for City Employees Union
Local 237, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters 5,191
Number of votes for District Council 37
AFSCME, Local 420 AFL-CIO 6,134
Number of votes for neither 161
Margin of victory for 420 943
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For the Clerks Title (account clerks, clerks,
shorthand reporters stenographers, typists, telephone
operators, key punch operators, tabulators, office
appliance operators)
Approximate Number of Eligible Voters 3,179
Number of votes for Local 237 430
Number of votes for Local 420 1,560
Number of votes for neither 34
Margin of victory for 420 1,130
For the Messenger Title
Approximate Number of Eligible Voters 398
Number of votes for Local 237 89
Number of votes for Local 420 196
Number of votes for neither 5
Margin of victory for 420 107
For the Cooks and Senior Cooks Title
Approximate Number of Eligible Voters 388
Number of Votes for Local 237 181
Number of votes for Local 420 157
Number of Votes for neither 4
Margin of victory for 237 24
The margin of victory in the aides category, 943 votes, was slim.
In the messenger and clerical slots, the victory was resounding, although 237
had put little effort into the clerical campaign and had generally conceded to
DC37. The Teamster secured collective bargaining rights only for the cooks and
senior cooks, winning by a safe but not overwhelming majority. Despite their
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loss of the cooks, AFSCME came to representthe bulk of the non-professional
hospital employees in the city's public hospital and was committed to the task
of achieving the programs and gains it had promised in its campaign, both in
the hospitals themselves and on a city-wide level, since as a result of the vic-
tory, AFSCME became the largest public employee union in the city.
The voting returns give an inaccurate picture of the success of the
respective unions. When the campaign began in April, an estimated 10,500 workers
were active union members. Eight months later, after a long, bitter election
drive, 11,850 workers or an additional 1350 had voted. Local 237 lost approx-
imately 1000 supporters; 420 made a net gain of 2500. But where did the actual
realignment occur? 237 had included supervisors in their original membership
count. Supervisors were excluded from the election and therefore the total number
of new workers organized was higher than the returns indicate. Whereas it seems
that 237's support dwindled, it is possible that the decrease in 237 supporters
was slight or perhaps there was even a possible increase depending on the number
of enrolled supervisors in the first tally. Did 420 convert former 237 members
to its side or organize previously uncommitted workers to accumulate its gains?
The answer is again uncertain.
The Teamsters were shocked by their loss. They, afterall, had possess-
ed a large proportion of workers as members when the campaign had begun and were
able to implement their strategy immediately. Local 420 had started with fewer
members and required several months to launch their effort.5  Charging fraud
at the polls, the Teamsters appealed to the Department of Labor and demanded a
recount.
The Department of Labor handled the appeal in two stages: first,
they recounted the ballots and second, they investigated the procedural objections.
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For the recount, Department of Labor officials reviewed the void, challenged
and valid ballots. Both unions examined the void ballots to determine which ones
could be classified as valid. When the newly validated ballots were added to
the count, 420 received more additional votes than 237 in each of the four
election categories.6 The ballots in the aides classification determined the
outcome of the Teamster challenge. The recount revealed that 420 had secured
943 more votes than 237. The combined void and challenged ballots equalled 622.
Therefore, even if all of the latter ballots were accorded 237, Local 420 would
still be the winner of the election. 7 As a result the Department of Labor inves-
tigator concluded that, based on the ballots cast, AFSCME could rightfully be
declared the collective bargaining agent for hospital workers in contended titles.
After losing the first round of their appeal, the Teamsters launched
an attack on the manner in which the election had been administered raising four-
teen separate objections that required an extensive evaluation. The investigation
lasted nearly eight months. The hearings themselves took seven months. Both
sides frequently asked for adjournments or discovered new data they wished to
present. Soon after the hearings began, the Teamsters hired a new lawyer and re-
ceived a long postponement. The Teamsters of course were more responsible for
prolonging the porceedings, but AFSCME also contributed to the delay. 8 In addition,
to these procedural formalities, both unions agreed that political pressures
caused the Department of Labor to procrastinate in making its final ruling.
Lindsay was beginning his first term as mayor when the Teamsters
initiated their appeal. He had not yet established a labor policy since he was
still recovering from a bitter struggle with the city transit workers. Whereas
he knew that AFSCME would emerge as the most powerful union he nevertheless did
not want to alienate Local 237 Joint Council or the Teamster International. Local
237 needed time to gear up for the large loss of member dues and to take the
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necessary steps for revamping their organization. The Teamsters knew they
would lose their appeal, but took advantage of the time lapse to recover both
psychologically and financially from their defeat.9 As Teamster or Labor
Department sources admitted, Lindsay gave tacit approval to the Labor Department
to take its time in processing the case.10
While the appeal was being pursued, hostilities between the two
unions intensified. Since AFSCME had not been officially certified, the Team-
sters continued to represent their former members. AFSCME insisted that only
they had the right to represent workers on the job titles they had won in the
election and distributed leaflets to the effect. The Teamsters, however, con-
tinued to collect their dues. 11 Lillian Roberts approached Hospital Department
officials and asked them to oust the Teamsters. The Department refused to
take action until the appeal was settled.12 There were a series of violent in-
cidents similar to those that had occurred during the campaign. But in April
1966 a full-blown crisis erupted. The Teamsters threatened to cut off food and
medical supply deliveries to municipal hospitals in retaliation for the alleged
collusion between the city and Local 420.13 Both AFSCME and city newspapers
violently opposed the measure. Abstracts from four major New York newspapers
appeared in 420 news bulletins. The 420 headline read: "The papers say they're
wrong! - you know they're wrong! Excerpts from the newspapers were as follows: 1 4
New York Times "...It represented a declaration of war on the
sick, and dying by a bad loser in an interunion power struggle..."
Daily News "...This is as heartless and brutal a threat as we
can remember. Helpless hospital patients are in no way to
blame..."
New York Post "...Nicholas Kisburg, The Teamsters' spokesman,
has retreated hastily from his frenzied proclamations that
'this is a desperate struggle and there will be innocent
victims.' Having first challenged the city to see who comes
out with a bloodier nose, he now announces blandly that the
union is confident about avoiding a sidewalk confrontation."
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420 staff organized their members in preparation for breaking through the
picket lines, but the strike never materialized. Teamster leaders and Victor
Gotbaum were able to reach an accomodation. The incident served as an excell-
ent device for helping 420 win over Teamster as well as uncommitted members.
The continued conflict between the unions confused the workers. They
wanted to know who really represented them and who would pay for their fringe
benefits. Many Teamster members feared they would lose their insurance invest-
ment and coverage. Local 420 responded by promising to assume responsibility
for whatever payments were due workers, reimbursing them from the union treasury
until such time as 420 insurance programs would go into effect for new members.15
In the meantime, AFSCME made plans to start its programs for training classes and
to prepare its negotiation demands for salaries, sick days and summer hours.
In fact, AFSCME was successful in winning summer hour benefits for hospital wor-
kers. i.e., shorter shifts on hot summer days; which became effective in July,
1966.16 The propaganda campaign to encourage workers to leave 237 continued
even after the delivery strike threat had been removed. 420 staff accused the
Teamsters of opposing gains for workers in terms of raises, promotions and train-
ing by prolonging their appeal and postponing the time when 420 could negotiate
improvements for workers. Referring to the record from the appeals hearings,
a 420 leaflet remarked, "If you want to know who is holding up your raise, your
promotion, your training and your opportunity for a better way of life -
Read the Record.. the facts are all there.
The next time a loser comes to you - ask them the $64,000 question: Don't
Hospital Workers Count?"17
In May, the Teamsters undertook one last effort to curb AFSCME's
growth by withdrawing their petition to hold an election in the Practical Nurse
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job title. Since 420 did not have the requisite 30 per cent membership to
call for an election themselves, they protested the move. Appealing to the
nurses to renounce the union that would not work to guarantee them the bene-
fits of collective bargaining, 420 urged the practical nurses to join 420 en
masse since "... the rules state that any union that has, as members, 50 per
cent plus one of any title group is automatically declared the official bar-
gaining representative for that title." 1 8 AFSCME hoped to bypass another cam-
paign with the Teamsters and win the practical nurses title by simply enrolling
sufficient numbers. 420 did eventually win the right to represent the practical
nurses, but not during this particular episode with the Teamsters. 1 9
By late July, when the election appeal still had not been resolved,
420 took firm steps; its membership voted to strike on Labor Day, September 5,
if 420 was not certified as collective bargaining agent for hospital aides.
Using"Labor Day is Certification Day" as their slogan, union leaders insisted:
We will tolerate no more phony hearings by the Teamsters
We will tolerate no more foot-dragging by the Department
of Labor
We want nothing less than certification for Local 420 and
a decent wage for hospital workers. 2 0
Once again the city hospitals were in an uproar as administrators, patients and
workers prepared to deal with the eventuality of a strike.
The Department of Labor made its ruling just in time. On August 29,
it issued a report negating all the charges raised by the Teamsters. 2 1
1) With respect to 237's charge that the one hour release time did
not give workers sufficient opportunity to vote, the Labor Department answered
that the workers knew they would not be penalized if they took longer and.that
there were no repercussions when delays did occur. Moreover, it added, those
workers who wanted to vote and encountered long lines, could come back later in
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the day and did so; since 70 per cent of the aides managed to vote, the Teamster
claim was unsubstantiated. 22
2) The investigators also refuted the charge that there had been no
guarantees against ballot stuffing. They commented that the Teamsters had been
unable to verify any fraud and that Department representatives testified that the
ballots were in full view of themselves and both unions' delegates throughout
the day. 2 3
3) The report dismissed objections that campaign literature was improp-
erly circulated immediately before the election, that electioneering transpired
adjacent to and inside the polls and that workers were turned away with claims
that there was no election taking place.2 4
4) Local 237 accused the Labor Department representatives of not per-
mitting union delegates to challenge ballots. The report concluded that, "...an
examination of the record abundantly supports the conclusion that both unions
including Local 237, were freely permitted not only to challenge prospective
voters, but at the counting of ballots to participate in saying which ballots
should be counted as void. 25
5) Finally, 237 challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order 49
which established the basis for holding the collective bargaining election in
the hospitals; the Teamsters concluded that the election itself was therefore
invalid. 2 6 The Labor Department examiner contested this allegation pointing out
that first,Local 237 had on many occasions benefited from Executive Order 49
and continued to represent a number of workers under its provisions; second,
Local 237 in December 1968 defended the validity of the Executive Order in a
case before the State Supreme Court and third, 237 participated in these hearings
for seven months and only on the last day did it raise this objection.
After reviewing all the testimony and stating its conclusions the
Department of Labor certified Local 237 as the collective bargaining repre-
sentative for the cooks title and Local 420 as representative for aides, clerical
workers and messengers. The hospital worker organizing campaign ended one
year and four months after the Teamsters first filed for an election. The
frenzy of the campaign would no longer by an integral part of the lives of
workers, administrators and union organizers. However, neither would there be
a return to the status quo that existed in the hospitals and that had charac-
terized city-union relations.
Before examining the consequences of the election, it is useful to
analyze the respective strategies of the unions. Unfortunately, the ballots
have been destroyed and there is no breakdown on the voting in each hospital;
nor is it feasible at this time to survey workers to determine why they voted
as they did. Although the available data is imprecise, it is possible to make
some conjectures about voting behavior based on assessments by, a number of par-
ticipants.
No single factor outweighed another in shaping worker opinion. Wor-
kers differed greatly in their estimation of the two unions; union organizers
disagree as to what aspect of the campaign most influenced worker choices. Never-
theless, one can draw some conclusions about the relative importance of several
factors in the overall strategy of the unions: staffing, programs, the union's
image, organizing style and past performance. The following analysis provides
insights into the process of organizing hospital workers per se as well as the
unique characteristics of the hospital sector as an environment for instituting
change.
Teamster staff members assigned to the election tended to be experienced
organizers; Local 420 organizers were in many cases newly trained. Whereas
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Teamster staff were initially better equipped to explain intricate hospital
regulations, to process grievances and to sell union membership to uncommitted
workers, 420 soon made up the difference. Teamster staff seemed bored by the
whole process and overconfident. AFSCME organizers by contrast were exhilarated
by the challenge; this was their first such drive and as the underdog, they
realized that they continually had to expand upon previous efforts 27
Both sets of staff had a large stake in the outcome of the election,
but with an essential difference. Local 237 organizers were in many cases en-
trenched hospital leaders. They had built a following and were committed to
the status quo, of course made more secure by Teamster ascendancy. 420 staff
were quite often newly raised from the ranks. Roberts intended to eliminate
the dead weight in her organization even at the cost of some slag at the begin-
ning and to build an operation that was dedicated to changing the status of wor-
kers and conditions in the hospital. Local 420 offered employment career ladders,
and made union positions accessible to all workers. Roberts' strategy not only
succeeded in motivating 420 hospital personnel, but proved an important incentive
for attracting new members. Over the eight month period, the differences be-
tween the two unions became obvious to many workers and may have accounted in
part for AFSCME's final victory.2 8
Staffing patterns may also have played a significant role in the
campaign. Local 237 concentrated its forces in the large hospitals with skeletal
crews in the others. Local 420 chose a different strategy placing a full com-
plement of staff in each institution. The election was close in the major insti-
tutions where 237 had focussed its efforts; 420 increased its margin by winning
small quantities of supporters, but in a number of individual hospitals. More-
over, in the smaller hospitals, individuals from a union could make a greater
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impact. An organizer who developed strong allegiances and assisted workers in
solving personal problems could swing an election solely by his personal rep-
utation. Local 420 benefited from several such leaders. The diffuse staffing
pattern was an important factor in AFSCME's victory. 2 9
One might ask if a similar strategy employed by the Teamsters would
have produced a victory for 237? Most observers expected the Teamsters to win
by a landslide in the larger city hospitals where they began the campaign as an
overwhelming favorite. Despite a heavy commitment of staff in these institutions,
the Teamsters did not win a majority in all the larger hospitals and when they
did win, the margin was small. Had 237 reassigned its staff to the smaller hos-
pitals, they might have increased their enrollment in these sites, but may well
have faltered in the others, since they required a full complement of staff to
vie equally with 420.
Why then did 237 do so poorly? Bill Lewis assumed that his reputation
as a racial leader would entice enough voters to clinch the election. In fact,
he expected a landslide in Harlem Hospital and Metropolitan Hospital where he
himself had originally organized workers and had cultivated a strong Negro fol-
lowing.30 Roberts immediately attempted to counter the image of her union as
"white" and developed her own image as a Negro by making her leadership visible
among the hospital workers. Eventually as the campaign progressed, the racial
distinction between the two unions no longer was an issue. 31 Many hospital wor-
kers did maintain their allegiance to Lewis and supported 237 in the election,
but Lewis greatly overestimated the extent to which this would occur. He did
not win resounding support from Negro voters. Local 420 neutralized race as a
factor in the campaign.
Local 237's image as a tough, hard-hitting union was the Teamsters'
key selling point. Individual Teamster leaders in the hospitals bolstered their
reputation by attacking management with greater fervor, roughing up opposition
organizers and keeping members in line. Teamster "goons" (strongarms) roamed
the corridors demonstrating to the weak, intimidated worker that the Tearsters
would give him the bold, haughty image he himself wanted to portray in confront-
ing the bosses.
AFSCME likewise intended to demonstrate an image of toughness, but they
chose a different approach. AFSCME focussed heavily on the importance of build-
ing their city-wide majority in collective bargaining certificates and thus at-
tacking management where the real decisions were made -- at city hall. AFSCME
would be tough in shaping the overall environment and conditions affecting wor-
kers, rather than concentrating on day-to-day matters. Moreover, AFSCME strove
to build worker self-esteem not by projecting the union's image, but by encour-
aging workers to take affirmative action on their own behalf in disputes with
supervisors and enrolling in training courses that AFSCME would sponsor.
Local 420 attempted to capitalize on Teamster violence and urged workers
to reject that brand of union representation. 420 organizers adamantly assert
that the gangster-like behavior of the Teamsters during the campaign alienated a
significant number of voters.3 2 The contrast was indeed apparent. Locker room
and cafeteria beatings were common and the knifing incidents well publicized. Many
workers may have believed that the Teamsters would not change after the election
and would permanently disrupt life in the hospitals to further their own ends,
not the hospital employees'.
It is difficult to evaluate the workers' response to the images por-
trayed by the unions. But the Teamsters tended to appeal to the older member
who worried most about personal encounters with supervisors and identified most
closely with what he himself could witness, that is a tough union leader in his
61
hospital. 420, to the contrary, was more apt to attract the younger member
who had not developed the cynicism of the older employee and regarded change
as possible. 420 offered him an alternative to dependency on his supervisor
and on his union.
420's proposed career ladder program contrasted to 237's promises of
higher wages and benefits. First, it was an extremely difficult concept to
sell. The workers who had been in the system and witnessed its resilience to
change were not easily convinced to the contrary. Newer employees had not
accepted hospital jobs with the intention of advancing in a career and saw them-
selves in a dead-end position. For them, however, the career ladder served as
a possible route they could follow. 420 organizers discovered great resistance
to their program among most workers. One organizer characterized the dilemma
as follows, "When people aren't in the habit of seeing tomorrow as a new day you
have a lot of work ahead of you convincing them that it's possible.33 Even
when workers agreed with 420 staff that the career ladder was a good idea, the
organizer had no way of knowing whether the worker really believed it. 34
Wages and fringe benefits, on the other hand, were more tangible,
especially to the worker who barely managed to get by from day to day. The
Teamster line seemed quite reasonable. The worker was guaranteed more food for
his family without having to exert himself by going back to school or enrolling
in an in-service course. All he would have to do is continue working as usual
and he could have salary increases; the union would fight for him.
The career ladder was not a significant issue in the campaign. Few
workers chose AFSCME over the Teamsters because they specifically hoped to
enroll in the new training programs.35 However, the fact that AFSCME had pro-
posed something like a career ladder did point to distinctions between the two
unions that influenced voters. AFSCME had taken the time to devise such a plan
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and expended energy trying to win acceptance for it. They believed that some-
thing could be done to change the worker's lot. Some workers may have thought
it preposterous; but it was one thing for the worker to feel that change was
hopeless and quite another to hear his union say so. AFSCME organizers at least
made him think about what advancements he might want and proposed a definite
solution, not as a campaign gimmick, but as a major focus of their organizing
drive.
Questions about the career ladder fed doubts about the Teamsters'
past performance. If one compared 420 with 237, there was no question that
237 ranked higher in its past commitment and accomplishments. But 420 admitted
that they had been lax. 237 continued to ride on their past merits and stated
that they would keep on doing the same fine job. 420's proposals for change
made workers wonder if 237's representation had been as good as the Teamsters
claimed. Wages were low, fringe benefits meager; hospital workers did not even
receive some of the benefits granted to other city employees. While 420 had not
been an active leader in the past, 237 had been behaving as a self-assured in-
cumbent. Many workers voted 420 because they felt that change would more likely
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produce better results than sticking with a union that preferred the status quo.
The incumbent status of 237 in many ways hurt their campaign. The
election occurred at a low point in the condition and services of the city hos-
pitals, and 237 had been identifying itself with management. Possibly, 237
staff were too professional in their approach, rejecting innovations and insisting
that they could best handle problems for workers. They played the role of the
entrenched administration indifferent to- outside pressures and challengers.
Whereas 420's operation was not as smooth and efficient, its staff expressed
the dissatisfaction that the workers themselves felt.
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In addition, there was a promise of major changes in union-management
relations as a consequence of the social welfare workers strike. It did not
necessarily make sense to support the more experienced' hospital union at a time
when innovations were possible. Moreover, the less established union in the
hospitals had forged requisite changes on the city level. Its hospital track
record may therefore have seemed less important to the hospital voter. Workers
who were undecided either did not vote at all or, if they wished to register an
opinion, tended to vote for 420.37 If they did not perceive any real differences
in the performance of the two unions, at least 420 had submitted proposals for
change. The incumbent Teamsters promised only a little bit more of what they
already had. 38
Thus far we have postulated why AFSCME succeeded in defeating the
Teamsters. We must also consider possible explanations for Teamster success in
the cooks and senior cooks title. AFSCME leaders assert that some cooks voted
for 237 because they wanted to belong to the same union as the dieticians. Cooks
performed many of the tasks performed by dieticians and served as supervisors of
dietary aides. They therefore felt a closer idenfitication to dieticians than
to workers. According to AFSCME, since many dieticians belonged to Local 237,
the cooks voted for the Teamsters. Those workers who preferred Local 420 were
told they would lose their jobs if they rejected 237. Because there was a small
number of cooks in each hospital, they believed that the dieticians would be
able to determine how they voted.39 AFSCME cites several other explanations for
the Teamsters' success. AFSCME did not use their best organizers to work with
cooks, did not devote enough attention to this job category and did not remove
leaders from their organization whom they knew were doing an ineffective job, 4 0
all logical conclusions for a loser to make. The Teamsters deny AFSCME charges
that the cooks were intimidated into voting for 237. They suggest that the cooks
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preferred their brand of representation and believed that Local 237 had been
doing an effective job.41 A combination of each interpretation probably pro-
vides the correct explanation.
Both unions were concerned that nearly one-third of the elegible
voters did not cast ballots at all and attribute their positions in the final
tally to their inability to win over this major segment of the hospital employee
population. The Teamsters admit that they planned their strategy without this
group in mind; they expected to win by securing the votes of present members
and converting some 420 members.42 AFSCME leaders attribute their failure to
the hypothetical quality of their program. The workers who could not seize upon
bread and butter issues, certainly would not join a union for training programs
and career advancement.43
Both unions agree, however, that a number of additional factors accounted
for the poor voting turnout.
1) Some evening shift workers did not have the time to vote after work
and could not return during the day because they had no one to watch their children
or had too long a distance to travel. For the same reasons many workers who were
off-duty on that day did not come to vote.
2) The unions argue that the voting set-up made it difficult to vote.
The Teamsters presented a full list of procedural obstacles in their appeal chal-
lenging the validity of the election, including long lines and insufficient re-
lease time. 420 asserts that management discouraged workers from voting even
though workers were authorized to receive one hour off with pay to vote. Their
view of the difficulty is that management made it difficult for workers who sup-
ported 420 to leave the hospital. Despite the biased position of both unions,
all the above factors may have contributed to the poor turnout.
3) The confusion of the campaign was a primary cause for the poor show-
ing. After eight months, it became difficult to distinguish the issues, to
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remember the promises and to determine one's own priorities. Workers switched
sides so frequently that it seemed inconsequential who won the election. Wor-
kers were confused by the turmoil in the hospitals, by the similarities of the
unions and also by their own feelings about what could be done to improve their
lot or what they wanted accomplished. Many therefore did not vote at all.
Worker apathy may have been a product of the long campaign, but for
many the apathy had been nourished by many years without change. There was no
basis on which to believe any of the unions' claims or promises. Either union
would come to power and merely increase its own coffer; few benefits would filter
down to the workers. Elderly workers were especially cynical. Many had origin-
ally worked in the garment district, paid dues and received little compensation
in return. Others had witnessed the growth of unions in the rest of the country
and saw only corruption and personal aggrandisement as the consequence of the
growth of large unions.44 Both unions failed to motivate these workers sufficiently
to consider union membership as apsitive gain.
5) Many workers did not vote because they then felt they would be
committed to joining that union. They intended to accept whatever benefits the
unions derived for the workers without binding themselves to union politics or
paying union dues. Union organizers tried to counteract this attitude, but never-
theless accepted these non-members as endemic to union organizing. 4 5
6) Finally, one must attribute the voting turnout in the hospital election
to the typical behavior of voters in a democracy. As one worker succinctly
defined the problem, "People don't vote for President. Why should they vote for
a union."4 6
It is again extremely difficult to weigh the various factors that may
or may not have contributed to success in the hospital workers' election. Many
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observers feel that there were no obvious differences between the two con-
tenders -- both operated the same way and offered the same promised. 4 7 Others
argue that although the differences were not astronomical, there was a reason-
able basis for selection. Looking at the victor, one might have concluded that
420 staff worked harder as organizers and more enthusiastically to improve worker
condition; or a worker might have felt that he was being short-changed by the
Teamsters, that is not getting all the money he was entitled to earn. Finally,
many hospital workers may have believed that the Teamsters were a company unicn,
arguing behind doors on ones behalf with the very same supervisor who had ini-
tiated punitive procedures and favoring the system where special favors, rather
than merit, determined promotions.
It is possible to draw some general conclusions Teamster leaders ad-
mitted their defeat was largely a consequence of their overconfidence in managing
the campaign. The specific policies established for operating the hospital
drive for the most part reflected this overall attitude. Teamster assuredness
put them on the defensive. Rather than producing an aggressive program and
recommending proposals for changes in the hospitals and in union operations, the
Teamsters expected their past record and current members to suffice. AFSCME
easily took the offensive position and although the underdog, retained the upper
hand by admitting past failures and immediately developing new concepts while
simultaneously attacking the Teamsters for refusing to change.
The analogy of New York City elections in the early 20th century to
the hospital organizing drive in 1965 is quite applicable and indeed explains
the essential differences in the style of the two unions. The Teamsters repre-
sented the old style machine politicians, fighting to preserve their system of
politics against the reform element. The bosses who had built their organiza-
tion from scratch were challenged by the reformers who rose to leadership by
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creating innovative approaches and bucking the system rather than conforming to
its rules. Thebosses learned from experience and developed a following by giving
their supporters some of the returns for sticking to the party line. The re-
formers were newcomers; they advocated improvements in all phases of the system
if not its downfall and appealed to supporters to become self-reliant rather than
rely on the bosses for everything they needed.
Lewis typified the ward boss with his ethnic backers, greasing the
machine on time for the election without creating any waves in the organization.
Roberts was the "upstart" reformer challenging the boss, being ridiculed by him,
but nevertheless refusing to play by the old rules. She created new rules and
new programs that she believed would appeal to the underlying desire of the hos-
pital worker for a real change in his existence.
Although the 1965 hospital organizing drive differs significantly from
a union campaign in which no previous organizing has been attempted, it never-
theless provides some basic insights into the process of organizing hospital
workers in any context.
Hospital workers are not middle class intellectuals. They do not re-
spond to anti-establishment rhetoric, nor do they think in terms of second auto-
mobiles, vacations and college educations. They are usually poor, and seek to
fulfill basic needs, Although their jobs may seem demeaning, they are committed
to working with people who are sick and helpless and wish to take pride in their
jobs. The best organizer is one who either is a worker himself or a person who
has developed an intimate knowledge of their fears, their needs and their aspir-
ations. 48 Roberts accepted this factor as a basic principle in selecting her
campaign staff. 237's organizing staff was to a much lesser degree a hospital
worker team.
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Nor can the hospital worker be easily convinced that he or anyone
can affect change. He has rarely seen change occur, at least not in the hos-
pitals. The hospital system perpetuates the status quo not only by downgrading its
workers, but by institutionalizing a method of delivering care. Administrators,
and professionals are rigid and everyone including patients and less-skilled wor-
kers must conform. The hospital worker will therefore not grasp radical ideas
and innovations. If anything, an incremental change that related directly to
his experience might be appealing. Lillian Roberts career ladder program serves
as a good example. Better training and new educational opportunities were not
proposed as a plan for transforming workers into doctors. It was a program for
assuring small promotions, and minor changes in job descriptions on a step by
step basis, although the end result might be drastic; the career ladder also
promised recognition for skills already learned and tasks performed that were
not commensurably rewarded. Nevertheless, many workers were still hesitant to
believe it could be implemented.
Moreover, not only would a radical program alienate workers, it would
meet insurmountable opposition from system leaders. Recognizing that a hospital
worker could perform skilled nursing tasks without formal training and a degree
is a threat to the registered nurse. Special training programs diminish her
credentials. For the administrator, it means training new people to fill posts
vacated by advancements and restructuring the hierarchy to accomodate the new
position. Roberts made her program saleable by emphasizing that the training would
reinforce skills that workers had already acquired in the course of their employ-
ment and convinced hospital administrators that the program would provide workers
to fill staffing gaps by using people who already were familiar with the system.
The strike is a last resort tactic to the hospital worker. It is never
haphazardly instituted. Both AFSCM and the Teamsters recognized this particular
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bias of the hospital worker in running their campaigns. Local 237 advocated
force in verbally confronting administrators; DC37 was willing to take a non-
negotiable stance at the bargaining table. Using muscle against hospital and
city authorities meant everything, but striking. Interestingly, AFSCME was
able to create an invaluable propaganda issue when the Teamsters threatened to
cut off food and medical supplies to the hospitals in April of 1966. Many
workers dropped their previous allegiance to 237 and affiliated with 420. Only
after many months of delay when no negotiations could take place did workers
in 420 vote to strike unless the Teamster appeal was settled. It is doubtful
that the union members seriously intended to carry out this threat for any
length of time. 4 9 The threat of a strike was used as a pressure tactic.
Worker self-respect is a basic issue in any hospital organizing ven-
ture. 420 and 237 again chose different tacks. 237 asserted that a strong
union would win respect for workers; 420 insisted that self-respect and self-
confidence would emerge if the workers took measures to help themselves - con-
fronting their supervisors and developing more worker skills. The latter approach
proved more appealing to New York City hospital workers and became an integ-
ral aspect not only of 420's campaign, but of their formal policy.
Public opposition can retard a hospital campaign, since there is gen-
erally little regard for the plight of hospital workers. Effecting change in a
hospital to many outsiders means denying care to patients. Fortunately, the
unions in 1965 did not encounter this opposition. The question was not whether
there would be a union, but which union would triumph. While the hospitals
themselves were resistent to change, the political climate was quite receptive.
Whichever union represented the hospital workers would be able to wrest signifi-
cant improvements from the city government by virtue of its clout in representing
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a majority of city employees. A hospital worker interviewed just prior to the
election by a New York Times reporter summed up the opinion of many voters and
described the environment in which the unions had been operating, "Seems to me
no matter who wins we're going to be better off around here than before." 5 0
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CHAPTER IV
THE OUTCOME
While the outcome of the election surprised everyone, the changes
that resulted met the expectations of all parties concerned. The young men
who accepted employment in city hospitals as dishwashers would not necessarily
have to spend the rest of their careers washing dishes. The hospital adminis-
trators who had always been desperate for additional funds received a budget
that better suited the needs of their institutions. Finally, the union staff
members who fought to build an effective organization found themselve the
leaders of the largest, most powerful union in the City of New York. The con-
clusions to this case study is fittingly a discussion of its consequences for
the people and institutions involved.
Although AFSCME did not focus its campaign promises on securing higher
wages and fringe benefits, it nevertheless won sizeable salary increases for
hospital workers in all job categories. As collective bargaining agent for
hospital workers, DC37 was no longer constrained by the Career and Salary Plan
regulations and salary increment scales. In June 1966 after extensive meetings
with Victor Gotbaum, Lindsay exempted all civil servant titles which were repre-
sented by unions holding collective bargaining certificates from the provisions
of the city's General Pay Plan. DC37 was therefore free to bargain for the
particular pay scale it wished to establish, set the terms for renegotiating
salaries and benefits and propose new job titles with the appropriate salary slots.
According to the terms of the first contract negotiated after the
election campaign, workers received from $900-1300 in pay raises over a two and
one-half year period. Under pressure from the union, starting salaries for
dietary, housekeeping and institutional aides rose from $3750 to $3800 effective
7 L,
July 1966 and $1400 effective July 1967. In the nurses aides catefory, ninimuz
salaries increased from $4000 to $4300 beginning January 1967 and $4600 beginning
January 1968.2
Yearly salary increments were as follows:3
For Housekeeping, Dietary For Nurses Aides
and Institutional Aides
effective July 1, 1966 - $375 increase effective January 1, 1967 - $375 increase
effective July 1, 1967 - $375 increase effective January 1, 1968 - $375 increase
effective July 1, 1968 - $150 increase effective July 1, 1968 - $150 increase
The initial raises secured by the union were considerable when comDared
to the increments formerly granted by the Pay Board, but moderate when compared
to the second settlement negotiated with the city. In December 1968 AFSCME an-
nounced that all hospital aides, technical assistants and clerical workers would
earn a minimum of $6000 per year. The event received city-wide attention. 4
Subsequent increases on the whole have been more than adequate. At the present
time, dietary aides without any formal training earn $7700 and college-educated
dieticians are paid only $9000. 5
420 fringe benefits have been extended also. Within two months after
certification, the union won a city-funded welfare plan6 and an optical plan. 7
The welfare plan increased the existing life insurance and disability payments and
added a number of accident coverage provisions as well as basic hospital care
benefits. The City agreed to finance the plan; AFSCME would handle its adminis-
tration. The optical plan provided free eye examinations and eyeglasses every
two years for the entrie family of a union member. At a later date, 420 imple-
mented a liberal sick pay plan. Workers received $75 per week from the union
above and beyond what they received from the City for accumulated sick days and
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were reimbursed for any medication costs that exceeded 75 cents per prescription.
In 1967 following the first negotiations on a city-wide basis, AFSCME
secured for all city workers including hospital employees cash overtime and shift
differential payments, unlimited accumulation of sick leave, travel allowances,
the continuation of summer hours and finally a new pension system with benefits
equalling more than half of a worker's full-time salary at retirement. 8
The initial phases of the career advancement training programs went
into effect immediately after the election, expanding continuously to incorporate
new job titles and to acccmodate additional workers. The first in-service train-
ing course which began in April 1966 covered nurses aides. Workers who enrolled
in this course attended classes part-time and worked in the hospital on a twenty
hour part-time basis. The program lasted twelve to fourteen months; students
received a federal allowance to subsidize the loss in work income for going to
school.9 Aides who wi'shed to receive training in technical services were pre-
pared for licensing exams in Inhalation Therapy, Operating Room, Central Supply,
Blood and Laboratory and EKG services. Workers who desired training to qualify
for LPN exams and positions enrolled in the nurses aides upgrading classes co-
sponsored by the Board of Education, Department of Hospitals, State Department
10
of Labor and Education and the City Manpower Administration. Nursing programs
continued to expand to give advanced training to LPNs in Pharmacology. At the
present time, a nurses aide can receive sufficient training through various
stages of advancement to become a Registered Nurse.11
For dietary and housekeeping aides, 420 established several mid-level
supervisory aide titles with commensurate training classes. Six different job
classifications were created in the senior dietary aide category: 1 2
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head cafeteria counterman
head storeroom operator
pantry supply control man
head scullery man
head dish machine operator
cook's helper
Whereas promotional opportunities had only been available for dietary staff in
the kitchens, the union created promotional lines for ward staff as well. In-
stitutional aides also acquired opportunities for advancement. Aides who were
performing tasks that could be classified as craft jobs earned credit as appren-
tices for their work in the hospital and finally received certification as
members of their particular craft.1 3
The union ensured that training programs were available to all workers
based on a competitive examination. Promotions to senior titles were based on
training, tests, work performance and the recommendation of the union.14 Although
seniority remained an important consideration, the union insisted that promotion-
al opportunities be posted. All employees were therefore eligible in the initial
stages.
By changing promotional lines and instituting training programs in
the hospitals, 420 not only revolutionized the career of the non-professional
hospital worker, but also made significant inroads into solving problems plaguing
the hospitals themselves. In fact, Department of Hospitals administrators recog-
nized that the selection of a collective bargaining agent would raise the level
15
of care in the institutions. AFSCME exerted considerable pressure on the city
to increase its budgetary allotments to the hospitals. In processing grievances
and handling routine matters with hospital administrators 420 became a potent
voice for improved health care services for workers and patients, for cleanliness
in all hospital areas and for safeguards against occupational hazards. Hospitals
authorities cleaned and painted employee locker rooms and meeting places and
II
most importantly, replaced old, antiquated machinery with new medical equipment.
Grievance machinery changed radically in the hands of the union. The
previous system had been chaotic. Individual supervisors and administrators
frequently circumvented whatever established rules the Department had promulgated.
AFSCME insisted that the Hospital Department clarify and formalize specific
procedures for disciplinary actions. The union then demanded special training
for all levels of management to learn how to handle worker problems and to
familiarize themselves with the new rulings.
Authorities at the local level resisted these changes. Supervisors
resented.having to attend training classes and saw training for lower level
supervisory positions as a threat to their authority. Hospital administrators
grew tired of the squabbling and constant reorganization, although they ul-
timately preferred an ordered system for relating to personnel.17 Both manage-
ment and labor had to decide who should attend grievance hearings, at what levels
a particular problem would be tackled, and finally what steps would be followed
18
for each different type of action. Eventually each hospital hired a labor
relations officer to mediate grievances and handle whatever labor problems would
arise.
At the departmental level, officials developed a new administrative
set-up. They established a labor section to oversee union-management relations
and to serve as a final appeals board for hospital disputes. 1 9 The Department
also reorganized existing divisions to meet the demands placed upon it by the
unions for reforming the patient care delivery system.
AFSCME's impact on the hospitals extended far beyond matters of sal-
aries, fringe benefits, working conditions and grievance procedures. Far from a
conservative voice to maintain worker prerogatives at the expense of patient care,
AFSCME served as a progressive force for change. During the campaign, Roberts
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had envisioned playing a significant role in shaping hospital policies. When
420 won the election, she implemented her programs. Increasing job mobility
was her primary goal. AFSCME relieved the chronic understaffing problem by
training workers to fill vacancies in technician and nursing slots; it also
brought stability to the hospital work force by developing incentives for keeping
employees on the job. Union staff and Hospital Department officials jointly
planned innovations in hospital precedures and patient services. 420 staff
were continually generating creative programs. They intended to utilize every
acquired skill or special feature of a job description to advance 420 members.
Roberts maintained an aggressive posture in hospital affairs. When
staffing needs changed,420 proposed the appropriate technical training course.
When workers or patients reported that the quality of care in the hospitals
20
had diminished, AFSCME advocated possible remedies.
The Teamsters recovered slowly from their loss. Membership declined
sharply in the first years after the election, rose slightly and then stabilized. 2 1
The rivalry between the Teamsters and AFSCME continued after the hospital election.
The two unions actively competed for employee groups that remained unaffiliated.
But the Teamsters simply could not compete as effectively. AFSCME bargained
for all city workers on employee benefit questions and could secure its demands
without the assistance of other unions. The Teamsters offered aggressive col-
lective bargaining representation to prospective members, but did not possess
AFSCME's clout. Eventually the unions negotiated a truce. Relations with city
officials were excellent. Governor Rockefeller, however, felt that the unions
were too strong and had begun to challenge their power. AFSCME and the Teamsters
realized that their continued rivalry wasted energy needed to confront the State. 2 2
District Council 37 and SSEU had lost their 1965 court appeal to stay
the provisions of the Condon-Wadlin Act. They nevertheless circumvented the court
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ruling by obtaining an exemption from the State Legislature. In late 1966,
the Legislature passed the Taylor Law which superseded Condon-Wadlin. Under
Condon-Wadlin, striking workers were automatically fired. If rehired after
a hearing, the workers were subject to stiff financial penalties. The Taylor
Law levied enormous fines against striking unions, not members. Unions found
guilty of violating the anti-strike clause forfeited their right to dues check-
off for eighteen months. The Taylor Law was milder than Condon-Wadlin because
the application of the Law was discretionary. More importantly, for the first
time, the Legislature recognized the right of public employees to organize.
Rockefeller, however, advocated a strict interpretation of the Law
and was therefore violently opposed by the New York City unions. AFSCME spon-
sored a mass rally in Madison Square Garden in May 1967 to criticize the governor
and the Taylor Law.23 In forging their truce, AFSCME and the Teamsters acknow-
ledged that their cooperation would be mandatory for future confrontations with
the Governor.
The hospital victory transformed DC37 into the largest, most powerful
union in New York. AFSCME was already the fastest growing public employee
union before the election; 2 4 four years later its membership had doubled.25
Similarly, the total number of employees that AFSCME represented as collective
bargaining agent increased enormously. In 1965, just prior to the election,
the Council represented approximately 105,000 employees. With the addition of
city-wide clerical and hospital workers, the number rose to 137,000 and by 1967
approached 145,000.26 AFSCME organized unaffiliated workers and successfully
wrested members from smaller unions that already possessed collective bargaining
rights. AFSCME challenged these unions to provide the kind of service it pro-
vided as the majority union in the city.27
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The policies of the Lindsay administration to a great extent facil-
itated AFSCME's development. In June 1966, Lindsay issued Executive Order 52
which, superseding Wagner's Executive Order 49, officially broadened the scope
of collective bargaining, provided a mechanism for resolving impasses in city-
union negotiations and established an Office of Collective Bargaining in place
of the Department of Labor. 2 8
The tri-partite panel set up by Wagner in 1965 in response to Dean
Schottland's recommendations finally issued its report in February 1966. The
tri-partite report criticized the informal union-management relationships that
Wagner had maintained, recommended that the city use third party neutrals to
resolve labor conflicts and finally suggested that the Mayor establish a tri-
partite independent agency to administer city labor programs. Gotbaum and
Lindsay wholeheartedly approved the panel's report. Lindsay in turn incorpor-
ated the report in his Executive Order.
As previously mentioned, he abolished the Career and Salary Plan for
employees represented by collective bargaining agents. AFSCME as well as other
unions thus had greater latitude in determining wages for their members. Lindsay
also established a new framework for collective bargaining negotiations by
creating two bargaining levels. Wages, working conditions and fringe benefits
which varied among job titles and governmental departments would be negotiated
for individual employee units. Pensions, vacations, sick leave and other policy
issues which applied equally to all employees could be negotiated only bh the
union that represented a majority of city workers. Since AFSCME represented 60%
of all city employees, it acquired authorization to bargain for all city workers
on major policy issues, not just the employees it represented. 2 9 Gotbaum had
assumed after the social welfare strike that the majority union would exercise
this power. Lindsay made the policy official.
In a newsletter announcing the implementation of the Mayor's order,
420 explained to its members what "bargaining on city-wide issues" w.-ould mean
for them. Their union would be developing demands for all city personnel for
improvements in the following areas:
"1. pensions
2. hospital and medical plans, workmen's compensation, sick leave,
and paid leaves for occupational injury
3. overtime, shift differentials, hours of work and hazard pay
4. annual leaves, holidays, leaves of absence, terminal leaves
5. appointments, promotions, seniority, inter-departmental
transfers
6. disciplinary matters and job-security
7. work study and training
8. pay procedures, implementation of contracts and car allowances" 3 0
Although Lindsay replaced Wagner's informal system of handling union
relations with a formal collective bargaining mechanism, he nevertheless soon
developed his own informal system. Relations between Lindsay and Gotbaum were
good, perhaps better than their critics would have preferred. Gotbaum encounter-
ed little opposition from Lindsay at the bargaining table. Good relations with
the Mayor enhanced his own personal prestige and guaranteed generous employee
contracts.
In a victory issue of their newspaper, released just after the Teamster
defeat, DC37 leaders committed themselves to an enormous task. The editorial
concluded:
"Now we'll see that hospital workers get the jobs they're proud
of, fair treatment by supervisors and a chance to advance. Only
then will there be respect for the sick poor who use the city
hospitals... Our union will bring decent standards to hospital
workers and better care for patients." 3 2
Indeed AFSCME accomplished all it had promised its supporters during the hospital
election and even more.
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In the same edition, AFSCME leaders boasted to their members, "Now
we're the union for public employees." 3 3 After seven years, AFSCME remains
in first place.
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